



SHAREHOLDERS DENIED RECOVERY OF COUNSEL
FEES BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO SEEK FTC ACTION
BEFORE BRINGING SUCCESSFUL DERIVATIVE SUIT
: Two directors of Merritt-Chapman & Scott were also directors of
Montgomery Ward. A minority shareholder of the former instituted a
derivative suit to compel resignation of the dual directors I from the board
of either company, contending that their presence on both boards con-
stituted an interlocking directorate prohibited by section 8 of the Clayton
Act.2 When the two resigned from the board of Montgomery Ward the
issue became moot and defendants were granted summary judgment. The
court then denied plaintiff's motion for reimbursement of reasonable counsel
fees on the ground that the FTC could have obtained the directors' resig-
nations 3 without cost to plaintiff,4 holding that a shareholder who proceeds
privately before ascertaining that a gratuitous remedy is not forthcoming
cannot, even if successful, charge the corporation with the expense he has
assumed. Schectman v. Wolfson, 141 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).r
Courts allow a shareholder who has successfully brought a derivative
suit recovery of reasonable counsel fees from the corporation 0 because the
corporation has benefited from his action and to encourage shareholders
1. Plaintiff also sought the resignation of a third Montgomery Ward director,
not on the Merritt-Chapman board but alleged to be under the control of one of the
other two directors. Her term expired before trial, and she did not seek reelection.
Instant case at 454-55.
2. 38 STAT. 732 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1952).
3. Section 11 of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 21 (1952), charges the FTC to order a hearing when it has reason to believe a vio-
lation of section 8 exists. If the hearing shows a violation, the Commission issues
a cease and desist order enforceable by a United States court of appeals. The general
procedures of the FTC provide for Commission action on complaints and informa-
tion filed by private parties. 16 C.F.R. § 1.11 (Supp. 1955).
4. See FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 25 (1929).
5. "Lawyers consulted by a stockholder who seeks redress of wrongs which he
feels the corporation is suffering should, wherever a gratuitous remedy is afforded, so
advise their client. If the client insists upon proceeding privately before ascertaining
that the gratuitous remedy is not forthcoming, he cannot thereafter . . . charge the
corporation with the expense that he has voluntarily assumed." Instant case at 456.
There is no indication whether plaintiff in the instant case was so advised, or whether
the court would limit its holding to instances where such advice has been given and
ignored.
6. See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881) ; Holthusen v. Edward G. Budd
Mfg. Co., 55 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Pa. 1944). "The court's power to compensate the
successful attorneys for the complainants stems from inherent power." Hornstein,
New Aspects of Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 47 COLUM. L. Izv. 1, 24 (1947). See
also Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 COLUm. L.
RmV. 784 (1939); Annot., 152 A.L.R. 909 (1944).
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generally to assume the costly task of policing the corporate managers.7
Such suits usually result in no direct gain for the shareholder-plaintiff.8
Derivative suitors are entitled to such fees so long as the purpose of the
suit is accomplished, even though the action is not pursued to final judg-
ment.0 However, fees have been denied when the desired result could have
been achieved without resort to legal action, as where the directors enforced
the alleged corporate right independently of the derivative suit,lO and when
the shareholder's action, although it achieved its purpose, brought no benefit
to the corporation." Derivative suits are permitted despite available
administrative action that could accomplish the same result, and recovery
of counsel fees has apparently not been disputed in such cases.' 2 The
instant case is the first to deny counsel fees where resort to legal process
was necessary' 3 but the shareholder did not seek administrative action
before bringing suit.
7. See BALLANTINZ, CoR~oPRTIoNs § 156 n.30 (rev. ed. 1946); Hornstein, The
Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 CoLum. L. Rrv. 784, 791-94 (1939).
8. See Meyer v. Fleming, 327 U.S. 161 (1946); Price v. Gurney, 324 U.S. 100
(1945) ; Felsenheld v. Bloch Bros. Tobacco Co., 119 W. Va. 167, 192 S.E. 545 (1937);
BALLANTIN4, CORPORATIONS § 143 (rev. ed. 1946); Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in
Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 CoLum. L. Rzv. 784, 785 (1939).
9. Rogers v. Hill, 34 F. Supp. 358, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Greenough v. Coeur
D'Alenes Lead Co., 52 Idaho 599, 18 P.2d 288 (1932); see Hornstein, The Counsel
Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits, 39 CoLum. L. Rzv. 784, 807-10 (1939).
10. Wolfes v. Paragon Oil Refining Co., 74 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1934); Evans
v. Diamond Alkali Co., 315 Pa. 335, 340, 172 Atl. 678, 680 (1934).
11. See, e.g., Alexander v. Atlanta & W.P.R.R., 113 Ga. 193, 38 S.E. 772 (1901)
(injunction of ultra vires act which was not fraudulent and did not harm the corpora-
tion) ; Hubbard v. The Camperdown Mills, 25 S.C. 496, 1 S.E. 5 (1886) (shareholder
sued to have receiver appointed). Fees have also been denied where plaintiff has en-
forced an individual right. See Burley Tobacco Co. v. Vest, 165 Ky. 762, 771, 178
S.W. 1102, 1105 (1915) (right to vote); Hildreth v. Western Realty Co., 62 N.D.
233, 242 N.W. 679 (1932) (change in capital). Nor may intervening shareholder-
plaintiffs recover counsel fees for work merely duplicating the original plaintiff's ef-
forts. See Ex parte Gray, 157 Ala. 358, 47 So. 286 (1908) ; Mann v. Superior Court,
53 Cal. App. 2d 272, 127 P.2d 970 (1942) ; Goodwin v. von Cotzhausen, 171 Wis. 351,
177 N.W. 618 (1920) (plaintiff entitled to fees even though joined because of valuable
services contributed).
If a shareholder has not made a demand on the directors or, in some cases, the
other shareholders, before bringing suit, his case is dismissed and he is not entitled to
counsel fees. Wathen v. Jackson Oil & Refining Co., 235 U.S. 635 (1915) (demand on
directors); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881) (demand on shareholders);
Lucking v. Delano, 129 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1942) (demand on receiver) ; see BALLAN-
Tim, CoRPoRATIoNs § 145 (rev. ed. 1946); Stickells, Derivative Suits-The Require-
ment of Denmand Upon the Stockholders, 33 B.U.L. Riv. 435 (1953).
12. E.g., Goldstein v.. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944) (derivative suit for
accounting of profits from violation of Public Utility Holding Company Act where
SEC had jurisdiction); Dederick v. North American Co., 48 F. Supp. 410 (S.D.N.Y.
1943) (shareholder sued for accounting and injunction against violation of Public
Utility Holding Company Act when SEC action was pending). See also De Koven
v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry., 216 Fed. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1914) (shareholder brought suit
to enjoin merger allegedly in violation of Sherman Act when Attorney General could
have enjoined; injunction denied on substantive grounds).
13. Plaintiff's complaint was filed after demand to correct the alleged wrong had
been made on the corporation and refused. Instant case at 454. In its opinion, the court
says it is difficult to believe that, as the defendant claims, the institution of the present
action did not bring about the directors' resignation. At any rate, for the purpose of
this decision such a causal relationship can be assumed. Id. at 455.
RECENT CASES
Since a shareholder suing on the corporation's behalf with expectation
of reimbursement for counsel fees is in effect spending corporate funds,14
he should choose a mode of action suited to the corporate interests and
should not act solely for the benefit of himself 1 or his attorney. In the
instant case, however, there is no indication that plaintiff's decision to
bring a derivative suit rather than apply to the FTC was motivated by
anything but his desire to serve the best interests of the corporation. In
the first place, although the FTC bears the entire cost of its actions,'6
recourse to the FTC may not be wholly without cost to the shareholder; he
may still need the services of counsel to investigate, to advise whether a
violation exists and what the shareholder can and should do, and to present
a complaint to the Commission with supporting evidence sufficient to en-
courage FTC action1 7 If his objective is adcomplished and it benefits
the corporation, he probably would be reimbursed for expenses so in-
curred.' 8 Thus, administrative action would not in fact be wholly gratuitous,
and the corporation might still be charged for expenses. Secondly, not-
withstanding that application to the FTC might have involved less cost
than a derivative suit, other factors may have made the derivative action
more advantageous to the corporation. Time was significant, for so long
as the interlocking directorate continued there was a possibility of damage
suits against the corporation.' 9 While a derivative suit in the Southern
District of New York might have reached final judgment within six months
to a year,20 it was quite possible that obtaining effective FTC aid would
have required even longer. At the outset, several months would probably
14. It is generally accepted that the shareholder-plaintiff bears some fiduciary re-
lationship to the corporation. See BALLAN~rimN, Coa'oRAvIoNs § 145 (rev. ed. 1946).
Some courts have gone so far as to regard the derivative suitor as comparable to a
guardian ad litem. See Denicke v. Anglo California Nat'l Bank, 45 F. Supp. 524 (N.D.
Cal. 1942) ; Whitten v. Dabney, 171 Cal. 621, 631, 154 Pac. 312, 316 (1916) ; Goodwin
v. Castleton, 19 Wash. 2d 748, 763, 144 P.2d 725, 732 (1944).
15. There are several possibilities for such self-benefit. E.g., plaintiff may himself
be an attorney and entitled to the reasonable value of whatever services he renders for
the corporation's benefit. See Rogers v. Hill, 34 F. Supp. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). Plain-
tiff might arrange a rebate or "kickback" from his attorney, or authorize his attorney
to prosecute a derivative suit to repay a debt or favor owed the attorney. A share-
holder might also bring suit intending to extract a settlement for himself in return for
dropping the action. See BALLANTIZm, CoaroRAiows § 152 (rev. ed. 1946).
16. See FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 25 (1929).
17. Cf. In the Matter of North Shore Gas Co., 13 S.E.C. 139 (1943) (shareholders'
attorney awarded $27,500 for studying and presenting case to the SEC).
18. See ibid.; Martman v. Oatman Gold Mining & Milling Co., 198 Pac. 717
(Ariz. 1921) (shareholder reimbursed for counsel fees incurred in investigating and
initiating action by state corporations commission) ; Dottenheim v. Emerson Elec. Mfg.
Co., 77 F. Supp. 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1948) (shareholder awarded counsel fees incurred in
investigation and in notifying directors that he would take action).
19. See Clayton Act §4, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §15 (1952).
20. See letter from Myron Gollub, clerk to Judge David N. Eddelstein of the
Southern District of New York, to the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Oct.
19, 1956, on file in Biddle Law Library. See also JuDICmIL CONPr=NCZ op THn UNITZ
SATrAs AxN. Rz'. 178 (1955) (table C-5).
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be consumed by the investigation 2 1 which the FTC must conduct 2 before
deciding whether to issue a complaint. If a complaint is issued and no
settlement results, a hearing after at least thirty days notice would be re-
quired. 3 Enforcement of an ensuing cease and desist order might then
have to be sought in the circuit court.24  Between the issuance of a com-
plaint and enforcement of the order two years or more could be consumed.
25
Furthermore, the FTC may discontinue a case at any point,26 rendering
the time previously consumed wasted. Moreover, the Commission seems
reluctant to attempt enforcement of section 8 at all; 27 from its inception in
1914 through 1955 the FTC never issued a cease and desist order
based on section 8.2 Another important consideration in the instant case
was the available form of relief. In addition to removal of the offending
directors, plaintiff had sought damages for any harm to the corporation
resulting from the allegedly unlawful relationship 2 9 While both the court 3 0
and the FTC 31 had the power to order removal, the FTC could not award
damages.3 2  Hence, had the corporation suffered injury a derivative suit
would still have been necessary after FTC action. In addition, since the
FTC and the Justice Department cooperate in fields where, as here, they
21. Of the 171 anti-monopoly investigations pending in FTC branch .offices on
June 30, 1954, 63% had been pending up to six months from the date they had been
sent to the office, 15% had been pending from six months to one year, 6% from twelve
to eighteen months and 16% from eighteen months to two years. Of the 264 cases
pending on June 30, 1955, 72% had been pending up to six months, 16% from six
months to one year, 9% from twelve to eighteen months and 3% from eighteen months
to two years. FTC ANN. Rim 20 (1955).
22. Clayton Act § 11, 38 STAT. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1952).
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. On June 30, 1954, of the seventy-one FTC anti-monopoly cases pending in
litigation, 48% had been pending up to two years from the date of the complaint, 46%
from two to six years and 6% over six years. Of the seventy cases pending on June
30, 1955, 62% had been pending up to two years, 34% from two to six years and
4% over six years. FTC ANN. R4s. 21 (1955).
26. See Clayton Act § 11, 38 STAT. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1952);
16 C.F.R. § 1.42 (Supp. 1955); FTC ANN. REP. 87 (1953). A private party cannot
demand relief from the FTC as of right. FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929). In a
situation similar to that of the instant case the same court held that a shareholder could
bring a derivative suit although the SEC had jurisdiction. "In the Commission pro-
ceeding plaintiff has no control of the action. Should the Commission abandon the
proceeding there is nothing plaintiff can do about it." Dederick v. North American
Co., 48 F. Supp. 410, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
,27. This apparent reluctance has been attributed to uncertainty as to what § 8
requires the FTC to prove. 54 CoLum. L. Ri. 130 (1954). See Kramer, Interlocking
Directorships and the Clayton Act After 35 Years, 59 YALI L.J. 1266 (1950).
28. Letter from John T. Loughlin, Assistant to the FTC General Counsel, to the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Nov. 28, 1956, on file in Biddle Law Library.
29. See conclusion of complaint in instant case. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, p.
12 n.3, on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Civil
No. 105-300.
30. Clayton Act § 16, 38 STAT. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1952).
31. Clayton Act § 11, 38 STAT. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1952).
32. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 S~TAT. 717 (1914), as amended, 15
U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1952) ; Clayton Act § 11, 38 STAT. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 21 (1952).
RECENT CASES
have concurrent jurisdiction,as the FTC could have referred the case to
the Justice Department for injunction proceedings. Had this occurred, a
judgment favorable to the government would have established a prima facie
violation in triple-damage suits against the corporation by any party in-
jured by the interlocking directorate,34 thus leaving the corporation easy
prey for expensive private suits. The possibility of harmful publicity
attendant to a government action 5 might also have been a factor in-
fluencing plaintiff to bring a private action. It would appear, then, that
bringing a derivative suit rather than applying to the FTC was not shown
to have been a breach of the shareholder's duty to the corporation, and so
far as this is the determining factor, plaintiff should have been awarded
counsel fees. By denying counsel under these circumstances, the court has
discouraged the functioning of derivative suits as a check on the activities of
corporate managers.
Even though the shareholder may have acted in the interest of the
corporation, the court may have considered that the public interest demands
the FTC have the first opportunity to take action, and that barring re-
covery of counsel fees was a suitable sanction to encourage shareholders
to afford the FTC such opportunity. But nothing in the enforcement
pr6visions of the Clayton Act calls for exhaustion of administrative remedies
before recourse may be had to the courts. Rather, the act provides for
enforcement by the Justice Department, 8 by the FTC 7 either on its
own initiative or on the complaint of an injured party,3 8 and by private
parties3 9 Action by any one of these agencies will not bar concurrent or
subsequent action by another,40 nor is there any required sequence for
commencing such actions. 41 Finally, it is not inconsistent with antitrust
enforcement policy to permit private suit prior to application for govern-
ment enforcement. In fact, Congress, realizing that without the aid of
private suits understaffed government agencies could not handle effectively
the great volume of investigation and prosecution required for proper
33. See REPORT O TH ATtomMY GxNmuw's NATIONAL CoMMITTE To STUDY
TH4 ANTiTRUsT LAWS 374-76 (1955).
34. Clayton Act § 5, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1952). It is even pos-
sible that an FTC order, upheld by the circuit court, would have the same effect. See
Proper v. John Bene & Sons, Inc., 295 Feil. 729, 731-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
35. While in some cases a derivative suit may be as newsworthy as action by the
United States, ordinarily government action receives more attention in the press. There
also would seem more stigma attached by an action of a government body than by a
shareholder's suit.
36. 38 STAT. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1952).
37. 38 STAT. 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1952).
38. 16 C.F.R. § 1.11 (Supp. 1955) (FTC general procedures).
39. 38 STAT. 737 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1952).
40. See Clayton Act §§ 5, 11, 38 STAT. 731, 734 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 16, 21 (1952).
41. Ibid.
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enforcement, 42 provided for private injunctive relief 43 and treble damage
suits 44 to enable injured parties to "recover their own damages without
waiting upon the slow and tortuous course of prosecution on the part of
the Government." 45
Federal Jurisdiction-
COURTS SPLIT ON WHETHER STATE OR UNIFORM
FEDERAL RULE CONTROLS GOVERNMENT ACTION
FOR CONVERSION UNDER FARMERS
HOME ADMINISTRATION ACT
The United States, acting through the Farmers Home Administration,1
extended to a farmer a production and subsistence loan secured by a
chattel mortgage which prohibited sale of the mortgaged chattel without
the mortgagee's written consent. Among the chattels was a cow which
the farmer subsequently consigned for sale to a commission merchant with-
out the knowledge or consent of the Farmers Home Administration. The
commission merchant, unaware of the encumbrance, sold the cow and
returned the sales price less commission to the farmer. The United States
sued the commission merchant for conversion, seeking recovery of the
cow's reasonable market value. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the Missouri
district court's dismissal of the action, holding that state law applied
under which the commission merchant is not subject to tort liability.
United States v. Kramel, 234 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1956). On similar facts,
a district court in California held that not state law, but the common law
prevailing in the federal courts governed, and declared the commission
merchant not liable. United States v. Matthews, 139 F. Supp. 683 (N.D.
Cal. 1956). Although both courts reached the same result, a potential
source of conflict is presented by the application in Kramel of state law 2
and in Matthews of a purported uniform federal rule, especially in view
of Missouri's minority position on the liability of innocent commission
merchants.3
42. See iRSPORT op TH4 ATTORNEY GXNERAL's NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY
THs ANTITRUST LAws 378-79 (1955); Bushby, The Unknown Quantity in Private
Antitrust Suits -The Defense of in Pari Delicto, 42 VA. L. REv. 785, 788-89, 798
(1956).
43. Clayton Act § 15, 38 STAT. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1952).
44. Clayton Act § 4, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952).
45. 51 CONG. Rsc. 16319 (1914).
1. Established under the Farmers Home Administration Act of 1946, 60 STAT.
1072, 7 U.S.C. § 1001 (1952).
2. Neither the court nor counsel in Kramel cited the earlier Matthews decision.
3. Missouri courts have held that a commission merchant who innocently sells
stolen or mortgaged cattle for the apparent owner is not liable in tort for conversion.
Cresswell v. Leftridge, 194 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. App. 1946) ; Blackwell v. Laird, 236 Mo.
App. 1217, 163 S.W.2d 91 (1942). The more widely-accepted tort rule holds the mer-
RECENT CASES
In cases arising in the federal courts, where the presence of a federal
interest 4 is ascertained and Congress has neither expressly formulated a
rule to govern the transaction nor directed that state law should control,
5
it is for the federal courts to "fashion their own rule." 6 There may be
applied the law of the state in which the court sits, 7 or a rule articulated
by the federal courts, usually referred to as a "uniform federal rule." 8
Recently the Supreme Court in Bank of America Natl Trust & Sa. Ass'n
v. Parnell 9 held state law controlling as to questions of good faith and
burden of proof in a private suit for conversion of federal Home Owners
Loan Corporation bonds, reasoning that state law should govern essen-
tially local transactions unless an overriding federal interest dictates its
replacement by a uniform federal rule.10 State law has also been applied
on the ground that Congress so intended " or that the federal statute
merely incorporated general legal concepts which have always been deter-
mined by local law.' 2 Courts applying a uniform federal rule have found
a congressional intent that the act be governed by such a rule,'2 that a
chant liable despite his lack of knowledge of the principal's fraudulent activities. See
Mason City Production Credit Ass'n v. Sig Ellingson & Co., 205 Minn. 537, 286 N.W.
713, cert. denied, 308 U.S. 637 (1939); Walker v. Caviness, 256 S.W.2d 880 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1953). See also RESTATEMENT, AGENCY § 349 (1933); Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d
1124 (1948).
4. Cases involving a federal interest are distinguished from strictly diversity cases
in which the rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), would require the
application of state law. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
A federal interest exists where the United States is a party or the case presents a "fed-
eral question." See Notes, Clearfield: Clouded Field of Federal Common Law, 53
COLUm. L. REv. 991 (1953) ; Erie Limited: The Confinws of State Law in the Federal
Courts, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 561 (1955); Exceptions to Erie v. Tompkins: The Survival
of Federal Common Law, 59 HARv. L. Rxv. 966 (1946); Gorrell & Weed, Erie Rail-
road: Ten Years After, 9 OHIO ST. L.J. 276 (1948). See also Mishkin, The Federal
"Question" in the District Courts, 53 CoLUm. L. Rlv. 157 (1953).
5. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1952), which expressly
makes state law applicable to tort claims against the United States. See also Note on
Federal Incorporation by Reference of State Law, in HART & WcirSLsR, THE FED-
XRAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 456 (1953).
6. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947) ; United States v. Alle-
gheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S.
363 (1943).
7. See cases cited in notes 10-12 infra.
8. United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944); Clearfield Trust Co.
v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); Dietrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940) ; see
Pofcher, The Choice of Law, State or Federal, in Cases Involving Government Con-
tracts, 12 LA. L. Rv. 37 (1951).
9. 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
10. "[T]hat the floating of securities of the United States might somehow or other
be adversely affected by the local rule of a particular State regarding the liability of a
converter ... is far too speculative, far too remote a possibility to justify the appli-
cation of federal law to transactions essentially of local concern." 352 U.S. at 33. See
also Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 289 (1941); Board of Commis-
sioners v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939); Continental Cas. Co. v. Schaefer, 173
F.2d 5, cert. denied, 337 U.S. 940 (1949).
11. RFC v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946).
12. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956); Poff v. Pennsylvania R.R., 327
U.S. 399 (1946); ef. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940).
13. Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942) ; Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938);
United States v. Lambeth, 176 F2d 810 (9th Cir. 1949) ; see Note, 9 Gao. WASH. L.
Rmv. 465 (1941).
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uniform federal rule was necessary to effectuate the policy of the act 14 or
that application of the varied state laws would impair the uniform operation
of a federal statute 1 5 and subject the rights and obligations of the United
States to "exceptional uncertainty." 6  The court in Kramel considered a
uniform federal rule unnecessary to effectuate the purposes of the act and
hence felt bound to apply state law.Y7 The Matthews court, however, held
that as the United States was proceeding under an act of Congress
instituting a national program, federal common law would more appro-
priately implement the policy of the act.' 8
When individual transactions incident to a federal program are
"essentially of local concern," 19 the traditional application of state law
in a federal system " militates in favor of recourse to state law.21 At the
same time, where such a program is of nationwide scope, it is desirable
that there be uniform operation of the act 2 2 and certainty as to the govern-
ment's rights and obligations.- On the one hand, a so-called "uniform
14. Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942); Dietrick v. Grean-
ey, 309 U.S. 190 (1940) ; see 47 CoLuM. L. RZv. 629 (1947).
15. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946); Jerome v. United States, 318
U.S. 101 (1943); see also RFC v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204, 209 (1946).
16. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
17. 234 F.2d at 581.
18. 139 F. Supp. at 688-89. The court relied heavily on the concurring opinion of
Justice Jackson in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447,
465 (1942) in which he stated: "The law which we apply to this case consists of prin-
ciples of established credit in jurisprudence selected by us because they are appropriate
to effectuate the policy of the governing Act. The [Federal Deposit Insurance] Cor-
poration was created and financed in part by the United States to bolster the entire
banking and credit structure. The Corporation did not simply step into the private shoes
of the local banks." Id. at 472. Matthews also placed great weight on Dietrick v.
Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940). Both these cases were distinguished by Kramel as in-
volving "either direct expressions in the particular act ... or clear intimations that
Congress intended uniformity of administration of the respective act under federal
control instead of use of State law." 234 F.2d at 582.
19. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 34
(1956). While this concept has been vigorously criticized for its ambiguity, id. at
122 (dissenting opinion), the "local" character of the transactions in the instant cases
seems indistinguishable from that of the transactions in Parnell.
20. See the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1952), which provides: "The
laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United
States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of
decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply."
See also Note, Clearfield: Clouded Field of Federal Common Law, 53 COLUM. L. REv.
991 (1953).
21. Where, as in the instant cases, the government is not a party to the transac-
tion, the party dealing without knowledge of the government's interest would reason-
ably expect local law to govern. Although this may be considered an additional factor
supporting application of state law, it does not affect the need for uniformity and cer-
tainty in administering a federal program. See text at note 26 iffra. Moreover, in
most instances all parties are aware of the governments interest. Even in the instant
cases defendant commission merchants could have discovered the mortgages, which
were recorded. See Matthews, 139 F. Supp. at 683; Brief for Appellant, p. 2, United
States v. Kramel, 234 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1956) ; 6 C.F.R. § 342.5(e) (Supp. 1955).
22. Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952) ; National Metropolitan Bank
v. United States, 323 U.S. 454 (1945) ; In re Pittsburgh Rys., 155 F.2d 477 (3d Cir.
1946).
23. See text and citation at note 16 supra.
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federal rule" will furnish certainty and uniformity only after it has developed
into a widely accepted proposition 24 or has been declared by the Supreme
Court.m State law, on the other hand, may never supply uniformity because
of variance among the states, but for a given transaction it would appear
more likely to provide present certainty as to the obligations of the parties.
Thus, which law should control in a particular case depends upon the
court's evaluation of the need for eventual uniformity through a federal
rule, balanced against state law's immediate certainty and its support in
tradition.23 The mere fact that a uniform federal rule would facilitate
administration of an act of Congress has been found insufficient to warrant
discarding state law 2 7 but if application of varying state laws clearly would
impair operation of a federal program, substitution of a uniform federal
rule is justified.2 8  Admittedly, the Farmers Home Administration Act is
national in effect and incorporates certain features which conceivably sug-
gest legislative intent to insulate the act from the diverse state laws.2 9
There is, nevertheless, no indication that application of state law to the
facts of Kramel and Matthews would compel any alteration in adminis-
tration of the act. In the absence of such a showing state law should
prevail.
Labor Law-
FEDERAL COURT DENIES SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
OF AN AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE DISPUTES
OVER TERMS OF NEW CONTRACT
A collective bargaining agreement provided that upon its expiration
any terms of the succeeding contract which could not be settled by nego-
tiation were to be arbitrated.' After negotiations on such a new contract
24. The circuit courts of appeals are not bound by each others' decisions. Sanitary
Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 35 (1929) ; Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg.
Co., 177 U.S. 485 (1900).
25. See Posados v. Warner, Barnes & Co., 279 U.S. 340, 345 (1929).
26. See Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104-05 (1943).
27. Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 153-54 (1944).
28. See Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952).
29. Standard forms are used throughout the country in the execution of promis-
sory notes and chattel mortgages. 6 C.F.R. §§ 342.3(f),(j) (Supp. 1955). In addition,
a uniform interest rate of five per cent is to be applied on the unpaid balance of all
production and subsistence loans. 6 id. § 341.4. See Brief for Appellant, p. 20, United
States v. Kramel, 234 F.2d 577 (8th Cir. 1956) : "In aiding farmers, the Government
lends money on terms and conditions that are not met by local lending agencies and
willingly takes collateral of a less durable type, such as livestock and crops . . .[it]
cannot, like a local bank, investigate, check and foreclose as soon as a borrowing farm-
er converts mortgaged property."
1. The arbitration board was to consist of two representatives of the union and
two of the company, with a fifth member to act as chairman who would be appointed
by the American Arbitration Association if the other four members could not agree
on his selection.
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failed, the employer refused to submit the disputed terms 2 to arbitration.
The union then sued in federal district court for specific performance of
the agreement to arbitrate under the United States Arbitration Act.3 The
court sustained employer's motion to dismiss, holding the agreement un-
enforceable since it called for the arbitration of disputes arising in nego-
tiation of a contract not yet formed, rather than disagreements arising out
of an existing contract. Boston Printing Pressmen's Union v. Potter
Press, 141 F. Supp. 553 (D. Mass. 1956).
Uniform enforcement of agreements to arbitrate labor disputes has
not been achieved under state arbitration laws because of variances in the
statutes 4 and general judicial hostility to enforcement of arbitration
agreements. 5 Prior to 1947 the United States Arbitration Act was equally
ineffective because of procedural obstacles to suits by and against unions.6
The Taft-Hartley Act, by removing these impediments,7 has enabled parties
to labor disputes to invoke the federal arbitration statute.8 The provision
describing enforceable agreements is section 2:
"A written provision in . . . a contract . . . to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . .
or an agreement to submit to arbitration an existing controversy aris-
ing out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and en-
forceable.. . ." 9
Under this section the First "I and Sixth 11 Circuits have enforced arbitra-
tion agreements that expressly limit arbitration to disputes in the applica-
2. Three weeks vacation with pay, two additional holidays and a sickness and acci-
dent program. Instant case at 555.
3. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1952).
4. For a summary of state statutes, see Gregory & Orlikoff, The Enforcement of
Labor Arbitration Agreements, 17 U. CmI. L. RAv. 233, 238-45 (1950).
5. For an analysis of this hostility, see Wolaver, The Historical Background of
Commercial Arbitration, 83 U. PA. L. Rtv. 132 (1934) ; Comment, 43 IL. L. R4v. 678
(1948). However, this judicial attitude does not extend to enforcement of arbitration
awards once made. Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924).
6. S. RrP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-18 (1947).
7. 61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1952) ; see Cox, Grievance Arbitra-
tion in the Federal Courts, 67 HARv. L. Rtv. 591 (1954).
8. The courts are divided as to whether the proviso, ".... nothing herein contained
shall apply to contracts of employment . . .," in § 1 of the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1952), excludes collective bargaining agreements. Compare Local 19, Warehouse
Workers Union v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 236 F.2d 776 (6th Cir. 1956) ; Local 205,
United Elec. Workers, AFL v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85 (1st Cir. 1956), cert.
granted, 25 U.S.L. W.iK 3104 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1956) (No. 276), with Lincoln Mills v.
Textile Workers, CIO, 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. granted, 25 U.S.L. W xx
3104 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1956) (No. 211) ; United Elec. Workers v. Miller Metal Products,
215 F2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954).
9. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1952).
10. Local 205, United Elec. Workers, AFL v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85 (1st
Cir. 1956), cert. granted, 25 U.S.L. WgxIc 3104 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1956) (No. 276); News-
paper Guild v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 233 F2d 102 (1st Cir. 1956) ; Goodall-
Sanford, Inc. v. United Textile Workers, AFL, 233 F.2d 104 (1st Cir. 1956), cert.
granted, 25 U.S.L. W]gK 3104 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1956) (No. 261).
11. Local 19, Warehouse Workers Union v. Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 236 F.2d
776 (6th Cir. 1956).
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tion and interpretation of the collective bargaining contract containing the
agreement to arbitrate. In determining whether a dispute is arbitrable,
the courts have applied rules of contract interpretation to discover the intent
of the parties, without otherwise examining the scope of section 2.12 The
instant court, the first to consider the enforceability of an agreement to
arbitrate a future contract, found that while the parties may have agreed
to arbitrate the dispute in question they may not have contemplated judicial
enforcement, which would be tantamount to "compulsory arbitration." 13
More significantly, the court construed the act as distinguishing between
disputes which require "prospective or quasi-legislative arbitration estab-
lishing future labor conditions not specifically envisaged in their earlier
contract" 14 and those which require "quasi-judicial awards directed at the
ascertainment of facts in a past controversy and at the prescription of
recoverable damages of other suitable awards for that which has been
broken," 15 holding the former inappropriate for specific performance be-
cause the judiciary should not become involved in labor-management dis-
putes over future working conditions.
Under the prior cases, a finding that the parties manifested in the
contract an intention to arbitrate the dispute apparently would have been
sufficient to conclude that it presented "a controversy thereafter arising out
of such contract." I Since the arbitration provision was part of a signed
agreement which purported to be binding, there seems little basis for the
court's suggestion that the parties did not foresee judicial enforcement.
Furthermore, a court petitioned to enforce an arbitration agreement is not
concerned with terms of the labor-management relationship, but leaves these
matters to the arbitrators.17 Nevertheless, other considerations may sup-
port the instant court's decision. Collective bargaining is basic to industrial
self-government because it results in agreements reflecting the respective
economic positions of the parties and the conditions of employment each
is willing to accept.' 8 Where the parties fail to reach agreement through
bargaining, resort to arbitration instead of economic warfare affords a
method of settlement that avoids economic waste. When, however, an
advance agreement provides that any disputes over the next contract not
settled by negotiations shall be submitted to arbitration, knowledge that
the arbitration clause is enforceable could impair the bargaining process by
removing the stimulus for agreement inherent in the fear of a work stop-
12. See cases cited in note 10 supra; cf. Local 19, Warehouse Workers Union v.
Buckeye Cotton Oil Co., 236 F2d 776 (6th Cir. 1956).
13. Instant case at 557.
14. Id. at 554.
15. Id. at 558.
16. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1952). See cases cited in notes 10 and 11 supra.
17. See Local 205, United Elec. Workers, AFL v. General Elec. Co., 233 F.2d
85, 101 (1st Cir. 1950), cert. granted, 25 U.S.L. WEEK, 3104 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1956) (No.
276).
18. See Cox, Labor-Management Relations, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 240 (1956) ; Tay-
lor, Government Regulation of Industrial Relations, in READINGS ON LABOR LAw 80,
83 (temp. ed. 1953).
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page.19 The economic efficiency of arbitration may outweigh the need for
self-negotiated agreement between the parties as to disputes of limited
scope, such as grievances, which may arise in administering an existing
contract.20 But where the subject of bargaining is an entire contract which
will probably contain new or modified policies of general application gov-
erning the labor-management relationship for the next period, the need
for effective bargaining is at its greatest, prevailing even over the harmful
effects of a potential strike. On this basis non-enforcement of the instant
arbitration agreement appears warranted. At the same time, although
the court's legislative-judicial distinction provides a suitable framework
for determining when these policy considerations should override the par-
ties' intentions, a too literal interpretation of the court's phrase "future
labor conditions not specifically envisaged" could lead to nullification of
arbitration agreements which deserve enforcement.
21
Restraint of Trade-
FEDERAL ALCOHOL ADMINISTRATION ACT HELD NOT
TO PROHIBIT TIE-IN SALE BY LIQUOR WHOLESALER
An exclusive wholesale distributor for a distilling corporation allegedly
sold a scarce class of liquor only to those retailers who would agree also
to purchase from the wholesaler a certain amount of a plentiful class. After
a hearing the Alcohol & Tobacco Tax Division of the Internal Revenue
Service suspended the wholesaler's selling permit,1 ruling that tie-in sales
violate section 5(a) of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, which
makes it unlawful for any liquor wholesaler:
"(A) Exclusive outlet. To require, by agreement or otherwise,
that any retailer engaged in the sale of distilled spirits . . . purchase
19. For a discussion of the effect that the threat of industrial warfare exerts on
collective bargaining, see Taylor, Government Regulation of Industrial Relations, in
READINGS ON LABOR LAW 80, 84 (temp. ed. 1953).
20. See Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67 HAuv. L. Rzv. 591,
605-07 (1954). But see Shulman, Reason, Contract, aid Law in Labor Relations, 68
HARV. L. REv. 999, 1008-16 (1955). Since this conclusion involves a balancing of poli-
cies, it may be less tenable where a disputed interpretation of the existing contract is of
equal import to the parties' relationship as an important term in a new contract. See
ibid.
21. See Goodall-Sanford, Inc. v. United Textile Workers, AFL, 233 F.2d 104
(1st Cir. 1956), cert. granted, 25 U.S.L. WEEK 3104 (U.S. Oct. 9, 1956) (No. 261),
where the employer's termination of business operations caused a dispute as to the
workers' employment status on a certain date, which was significant in determining
fringe benefits under the existing contract. The dispute was held "a controversy there-
after arising out of such contract" and hence arbitration was enforced, but it might
well be found that such a dispute was not "specifically envisaged" by the arbitration
agreement.
1. See Federal Alcohol Administration Act §4(e), 49 STAT. 979 (1935), 27
U.S.C. § 204(e) (1952).
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any such products from such [wholesaler] . . . to the exclusion in
whole or in part of distilled spirits . . . sold or offered for sale by
other persons in interstate or foreign commerce, if such requirement
is made in the course of interstate or foreign commerce, or if such
person engages in such practice to such an extent as substantially to
restrain or prevent transactions in interstate or foreign commerce in
any such products, or if the direct effect of such requirement is to
prevent, deter, hinder, or restrict other persons from selling or offer-
ing for sale any such products to such retailer in interstate or foreign
commerce . .. " 2
The circuit court, in setting aside the administrative order on appeal,3
held that the act does not prohibit such sales. Magnolia Liquor Co. v.
Cooper, 231 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. granted sub nom. Black v.
Magnolia Liquor Co., 25 U.S.L. WEEK 3119 (U.S. Oct. 23, 1956) (No.
359).
In administering the FAA Act 4 the Treasury Department I has never
issued a regulation specifically prohibiting tie-in sales, but since at least
1946 0 the Department has considered the act to prohibit them 7 and has
issued show cause orders to wholesalers who effect such sales.8 Prior to
2. 49 STAT. 981 (1935), 27 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1952). The appellant was also
charged with violating § 5(b) (7) of the act, 49 STAT. 981 (1935), 27 U.S.C. § 205(b)
(7) (1952). This section prohibits a wholesaler from requiring a retailer "to take and
dispose of a certain quota ......
3. Direct appeal of the administrative ruling to a circuit court of appeals is pro-
vided in § 4(h) of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 49 STAT. 980 (1935), 27
U.S.C. § 204(h) (1952).
4. 49 STAT. 977 (1935), 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-12 (1952). Upon repeal of prohibition,
NRA codes were instituted to prevent distillers from regaining control over retail out-
lets. The FAA Act, which replaced the codes when the NIRA was declared unconsti-
tutional, vested the Federal Alcohol Administration with the responsibility of enforc-
ing trade regulations in the liquor industry.
5. The Federal Alcohol Administration was abolished in 1940 pursuant to the Reor-
ganization Act of 1939, 53 STAT. 561, 5 U.S.C. § 133 (1952) and its functions were
transferred to the Secretary of the Treasury, who delegated them to the Deputy Com-
missioner in charge of the Alcohol Tax Unit of the Internal Revenue Service. The
Alcohol Tax Unit was re-designated as the Alcohol & Tobacco Tax Division in 1951.
Although the practices prohibited by § 5 of the act might also be prosecuted under
the anti-trust laws, see pp. 274-75 infra, enforcement is generally left to the Divi-
sion, apparently because this body can maintain a strict and effective supervision through
its close relationship with the industry.
6. At this time a show cause order, which was later dismissed by joint stipulation,
was issued to the appellant by the Alcohol & Tobacco Tax Division, charging tie-in
sales. See instant case at 943.
7. There has, however, been some doubt expressed by the Treasury Department
in this interpretation, as evidenced by a letter sent in 1947 by the Acting Secretary of
the Treasury to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate suggesting an amendment
to § 5(c) of the FAA Act, 49 STAT. 981 (1935), 27 U.S.C. § 205(c) (1952). 93 CONG.
REc. 10570 (1947). The amendment proposed would add to § 5(c): "by condition-
ing the purchase with the purchase of any other distilled spirits, wine or malt bever-
ages." Brief for Appellant, pp. 13-14.
8. Id. at 12. Hearings were never held under these orders, which were dismissed
by joint stipulation with the proviso that such stipulations not be used against the
wholesaler in any subsequent proceedings. Ibid.
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the instant case, however, the question has been before the courts
only once. In Distilled Brands, Inc. v. Dunigan9 the Second Circuit,
referring generally to section 5,10 reasoned that tie-in sales are "monopolistic
in purpose and effect" and as such "constitute a sufficient interference with
competition to require prohibition within the regulatory scheme of the
Federal Alcohol Administration Act." " The instant court, noting that
the subsection title "exclusive outlet" did not encompass tie-in sales and
construing the report of the House Committee on Ways and Means 12 as
showing no evidence of congressional intent to prohibit such sales, cited the
maxim that penal statutes are to be strictly construed and, refusing to
follow Distilled Brands, held that tie-in sales are not prohibited by sec-
tion 5 (a).
It is clearly possible to interpret section 5(a) as applying to tie-in
sales. When a wholesaler with access to scarce liquor predicates its sale
on the retailer's concurrent purchase of a readily available class of liquor,
the wholesaler may be considered to have "required" the second purchase.
A retailer refusing the tie-in may not only be deprived of potential sales
of the scarce class, but he may also lose unsatisfied customers to competing
retailers who accept the wholesaler's tie-in. Also, since the retailer is fore-
closed from exercising independent judgment as to his purchases of the
plentiful liquor, the tie-in is "to the exclusion in whole or in part" of
competing wholesalers in the plentiful brand who cannot similarly offer the
scarce product.1 3 It appears, moreover, that Congress intended to forbid
such sales. The House Report states that section 5 was designed to prevent
restrictions of competition in the liquor industry 14 by prohibiting practices
deemed "analogous to those prohibited by the antitrust laws." 15 The
particular device at which 5(a) was directed, although entitled "exclusive
outlets" in the act, is characterized by the Report as "exclusive purchase
arrangements," 16 and the antitrust provision applying to such arrange-
ments-section 3 of the Clayton Act 17 -has been held to declare tying
arrangements illegal s.8 The instant court apparently considered that Con-
9. 222 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1955).
10. 49 STAT. 981 (1935), 27 U.S.C. § 205 (1952).
11. 222 F.2d at 869.
12. H.R. Ri. No. 1542, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
13. Cf. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605(1953).
14. H.R. REP. No. 1542, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1935).
15. Id. at 12.
16. Ibid.
17. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1952). This section forbids any person
"engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or con-
tract for sale of goods ... whether patented or unpatented ... on the condition,
agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal
in the goods . . . of a competitor or competitors of the lessor or seller, where the
effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale . . . may be to substantially lessen com-
petition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."
18. Although tying arrangements may also violate § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26
STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952), they are generally tested under § 3 of the
Clayton Act. REPORT OP THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL ComIrrTEE To STUDY
THE ANTITRUST LAws 24-25 (1955).
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gress intended to limit the application of 5(a) to agreements expressly
forbidding the retailer from purchasing the tied commodity from other
wholesalers, but section 3 of the Clayton Act has not been so limited:
under this provision, the condition that the retailer not deal in the goods
of competing wholesalers has been inferred from the practical effects of
tied sales.' 9 Hence, as there appears no reason to view anti-competitive
practices in the liquor industry as less reprehensible than identical practices
in other industries,20 and since prohibition of tie-in sales would be con-
sistent with both the language of the act and the intent of Congress, sec-
tion 5 (a) should be considered to cover such sales.
Assuming the act applies to tie-in sales, the statutory standard deserves
examination. If the requisite relationship to interstate commerce is met,
2
there must be established "exclusion in whole or in part" of competing
sellers. "Exclusion" might be construed to require that because of the
tie-in a competing wholesaler was in fact excluded from making an actual
sale of the tied product to the retailer. Under this construction, if a par-
ticular brand of the tied product were carried only by the offending whole-
saler, and the retailer's consumer demand for that brand were equal to or
greater than the quantity he was required to purchase under the tie-in
arrangement, there would be no exclusion of actual sales because the
competing wholesaler could not supply that brand. Similarly, actual sales
would not be "excluded" if the retailer had no specific brand requirements
of the tied product but would have purchased voluntarily a quantity of
the tied brand equal to or greater than that tied-in. But tie-in sales
restrict competition even when there is no exclusion of actual sales. A
retailer who, regardless of his consumer demand, wished not to purchase
the offending wholesaler's brand of the tied product would be disinclined
to do so, for he would thereby lose access to the tying product. For the
same reason he would probably not attempt to influence a change in his
customer's preferences for the tied brand even if a competing wholesaler
offered a similar product at a lower price or better services. Thus, com-
peting wholesalers are necessarily denied an equal opportunity to sell the
tied product to the retailer. Therefore, in order best to achieve unfettered
competition, "exclusion" should be considered as resulting from all tie-in
sales. Furthermore, since Congress by the words "in whole or in part"
19. See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 606 n.23
(1953), citing International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131,
135 (1936) ; Thomson Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 952, 956 (1st Cir. 1945); Signode
Steel Strapping Co. v. FTC, 132 F.2d 48, 52 (4th Cir. 1942). See also REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL CoMMITTEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 139
(1955). For a recent consent decree enjoining tie-in sales, see United States v.
Philco Corp., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1956 Trade Cas.) 68409 (E.D. Pa. July 13,
1956) (orders for some products were filled by defendant only on condition that the
buyer purchase other products made and sold by defendant).
20. Indeed, Congress apparently saw greater danger from such practices in the
liquor industry. See text at note 23 infra.
21. See text at note 2 supra. For a discussion of the act's jurisdictional require-
ments, see de Ganahl, Trade Practice and Price Control in the Alcoholic Beverage
Industry, 7 LAW & CONTEmP. PROB. 665, 673-74 (1940).
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indicated that an exclusion of other wholesalers from competition for the
smallest part of the retailer's purchases should be sufficient to bring the
arrangement within the ban of section 5(a), it would appear that tie-in
sales are per se violations of the act. Such a standard, although fostering
an open market and simplifying administration,2 2 would unquestionably
be stringent. Notwithstanding, the more rigorous standard may be sup-
ported by Congress' language in the FAA Act as compared to that in
section 3 of the Clayton Act. While the Clayton Act requires the restrictive
practices to "substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly,"
the FAA Act specifies merely that other wholesalers be excluded in whole
or in part. At the same time, a strict standard would reflect Congress'
expressed apprehension that moral as well as economic evils may follow
from restrictive trade practices in the liquor industry because of resulting
forced stimulation of sales.2
Wages-
GUARANTEED WEEKLY WAGE CONTRACT WITH
PROPORTIONATE PAY REDUCTION FOR ABSENTEEISM
HELD WITHIN SECTION 7(e)
OF FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, employees of a truck-
ing firm who worked fluctuating hours were guaranteed a weekly salary
based on an assumed forty hours of work at a stipulated hourly rate
and an assumed eight hours of overtime at one and one-half times this
hourly rate. Compensation above the guaranty in any week, at the over-
time rate, was not to be paid until an employee exceeded forty-eight hours
actual work in that week. A provision of the contract permitted the reduc-
tion in any week of an employee's salary guaranty in the proportion that
the days he was unavailable for work bore to a full five-day workweek.1
There would, however, be no reduction for days when the employee re-
ported but found little or no work to be done. The Secretary of Labor
sought to enjoin employment of workers under this contract, claiming that
it violated section 7 (a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act 2 and did not
22. Cf. the test of legality under § 3 of the Clayton Act, which has recently been
summarized as requiring an economic analysis to determine whether the seller enjoyed
a dominant position in the market or a substantial number of sales in the product were
affected. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605-09 (1953).
23. See H.R. Rim. No. 1542, 74th Cong,, 1st Sess. 12 (1935).
1. "[W]ages ... shall be reduced in proportion to days absent during those weeks
where the employee fails to report for any reason other than lack of work ...
Instant case at 12.
2. 52 STAT. 1063 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1952) ; see text at note
7 infra.
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come within the saving provision of section 7(e),3 on the theory that the
contract provided no "weekly guaranty of pay" as required by section 7(e)
because of the reduction-for-absence provision.4 The district court granted
the injunction, but the circuit court reversed, holding that the contract
was within section 7(e).6 Mitchell v. Feinberg, 236 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1956),
cert. denied, 25 U.S.L. WEEK 3176 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1956) (No. 528).
Section 7(a) of the FLSA requires that an employer pay each em-
ployee "at least one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is
employed" for hours worked over forty.7 For salaried employees subject
to the act the "regular rate" for a particular week is normally computed
by dividing into the salary the number of hours actually worked during
that week.8 For each hour worked over forty, the employee is entitled
to receive one hundred and fifty per cent of this "regular rate." However,
in Walling v. A. H. Belo Corp.9 the Supreme Court gave special approval
to a guaranteed weekly salary contract which included overtime compensa-
tion determined by a novel method for workers with fluctuating weekly
hours. The Belo contract specified an hourly rate for forty-four hours,
the maximum then allowed by the statute without extra compensation,"'
and one and one-half times that rate for all further hours. The guaranteed
salary was equal to that which an employee would receive at these rates
for working fifty-four and two-thirds hours.1 Additional pay for hours
in excess of the statutory maximum was thus computed on the basis of the
contract hourly rate rather than on the basis of the "regular rate" as
normally determined for salaried employees. Consequently, where an
employee worked more hours than the statutory maximum but less than
the assumed number, his guaranteed weekly salary necessarily was less
than his total pay would have been if computed with overtime according
3. 63 STAT. 914 (1949), 29 U.S.C. § 207(e) (1952) ; see note 15 infra.
4. Brief for Appellee, pp. 16-17.
5. Mitchell v. Feinberg, 123 F. Supp. 899 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
6. The Secretary also contended that the contract was not within § 7(e) because
the guaranteed salary represented more hours than an employee ever worked in one
week, urging that § 7(e) requires the contract to specify an hourly rate which, by the
payment in some weeks of compensation exceeding the guaranty, is shown to be the
basis of the guaranteed salary. The instant court rejected this argument on the basis
of Mitchell v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 235 F.2d 942 (2d Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 25 U.S.L. Wix 3176 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1956) (No. 513). For
another discussion of this issue, see Mitchell v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 228 F.2d 291
(1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 25 U.S.L. WIMK 3176 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1956) (No. 86).
See also Tobin v. Little Rock Packing Co., 202 F.2d 234 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 832 (1953).
7. 52 STAr. 1063 (1938), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1952).
8. Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 580 n.16 (1942).
9. 316 U.S. 624 (1942).
10. Fair Labor Standards Act § 7(a), 52 STAT. 1063 (1938) (later amended by
63 STAT. 914 (1949), 29 U.S.C. §207(a) (1952)).
11. The Supreme Court used the slightly erroneous figure of fifty-four and one-half
hours. See Feldman, Algebra and the Supreme Court, 40 ILL. L. Rzv. 489, 497 n22
(1946).
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to a "regular rate" determined by dividing into the weekly salary the
actual number of hours worked.' 2 However, where he worked more hours
than the assumed number, his total pay with the guaranty plus additional
overtime at one and one-half times the contract rate necessarily exceeded
that computed with overtime according to the "regular rate." 11 The
Court's justification for permitting the contract hourly rate to serve as the
"regular rate" in this situation was to enable employees in businesses with
fluctuating work hours to enjoy a stable income.14 Section 7(e), enacted
in 1949, gives statutory authority to such employment contracts if they
provide, among other things, "a weekly guaranty of pay." 15 It has not
been expressly decided prior to the instant case whether a Belo-type
contract provides "a weekly guaranty of pay" within the meaning of
section 7(e) if it permits reduction of an employee's salary in proportion
to the days he is unavailable for work. However, before the enactment
of section 7(e), the Supreme Court in Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well
Cementing Co.16 held within the Belo exception a contract containing such
a clause,17 making no specific reference to the reduction provision but
stating generally, "[W]hatever differences exist between this case and
12. Under a Belo-type contract specifying a basic hourly rate of $1.50, with $2.25
for each hour over forty, a guaranteed weekly salary based on an assumed fifty hours
of work would provide the employee with a guaranty of $82.50. His "regular rate" in a
week during which he actually worked forty-five hours would be $1.83 1/3 per hour
($82.50 divided by forty-five hours), and his total pay at this rate, including time-and-
a-half for the five hours over forty, would be $87.08 (forty hours at $1.83 1/3 plus
five hours at $2.75). The latter method of computation will produce a total figure
higher than the $82.50 guaranty in every instance where the employee actually works
more than forty hours but less than fifty, since the "regular rate" is based at the outset
on the $82.50 guaranteed weekly salary. Where he actually works fifty hours, the total
by this method will be the same as the guaranty because the "regular rate" then
equals the contract hourly rate.
13. An employee who actually worked sixty hours would receive, under the con-
tract hypothesized in note 12 supra, a total of $105 ($82.50 guaranty plus ten addi-
tional hours at $2.25). In such a week his "regular rate" would be $1.37% per hour
($82.50 divided by sixty hours), entitling him at this rate, including time-and-a-half for
the twenty hours over forty, to a total pay of only $96.25 (forty hours at $1.37/ 2 plus
twenty hours at $2.06%). Whenever the employee actually works more than fifty hours,
the "regular rate" method will produce a smaller total figure than the $82.50 guaranty
plus overtime beyond fifty hours at one and one-half times the contract hourly rate,
since the "regular rate" must diminish as the number of hours worked increases, the
guaranteed weekly salary remaining constant.
14. 316 U.S. at 635.
15. "No employer shall be deemed to have violated subsection (a) of this section
by employing any employee for a workweek in excess of forty hours if such employee
is employed pursuant to a bona fide individual contract, or pursuant to an agreement
made as a result of collective bargaining by representatives of employees, if the duties
of such employee necessitate irregular hours of work, and the contract or agreement
(1) specifies a regular rate of pay of not less than the minimum [statutory] hourly
rate ...and compensation at not less than one and one-half times such rate for all
hours worked in excess of forty in any workweek, and (2) provides a weekly guaranty
of pay for not more than sixty hours based on the rates so specified." 63 STAT. 914
(1949), 29 U.S.C. §207(e) (1952).
16. 331 U.S. 17 (1947).
17. Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 152 F.2d 622, 624 (9th Cir.
1945) (dissenting opinion). The contract in Belo had no such provision. Brief for
Respondent, p. 8, Walling v. A. H. Belo Corp., 316 U.S. 624 (1942).
RECENT CASES
Belo are without substance . .. , s18 Since the passage of section 7(e)
the question was first raised in its statutory context by the Secretary of
Labor' 9 in Mitchell v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc.,2° but the First Circuit
did not mention the Secretary's contention in its opinion upholding the
contract. The instant court held that such a reduction provision constitutes
"insufficient ground to differentiate" 21 the contract from those not including
such a clause, but gave no explanation for this conclusion.
Contract provisions for the reduction of employees' weekly guaranties
are designed to curtail absenteeism and to absolve employers from payment
of wages when work is available but the employee does not appear. The
Secretary of Labor has urged that any contract containing such a provision
fails to provide "a weekly guaranty of pay," construing that requirement to
mean: "Whatever sum is guaranteed must be paid in full in all workweeks,
however short, in which the employee performs any amount of work for
the employer." 22 The Secretary maintains that the specificity of the
unqualified words "weekly guaranty" indicates that Congress intended an
unconditional guaranty, and that only such a guaranty would assure a
steady income to employees with irregular hours in conformity with the
purpose of section 7(e). While concededly this construction would afford
the utmost stability of income, the employees for whose benefit section 7(e)
was designed are not those suffering irregular working hours through
their own indisposition, but those whose "duties . . .*necessitate irregular
hours of work." 2 4 The Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division
has observed: "Even if an employee does in fact work a variable workweek,
the question must still be asked whether his duties necessitate irregular
hours of work. The subsection is not designed to apply in a situation where
the hours of work vary from week to week at the discretion of . . . the
employee." 2 Moreover, it seems unreasonable that dismissal should be an
employer's only sanction for employees who, by the Secretary's view, could
deliberately remain absent as many as four days of the week and still
collect full pay.26 Congress more likely intended "a weekly guaranty of
18. 331 U.S. at 22. See also Mitchell v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 228 F.2d 291, 295
(1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 25 U.S.L. WiZK 3176 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1956) (No. 86):
"Though the legislative history makes clear that the Congress had the Belo decision in
mind when it enacted the self-sufficient substantive provisions of new § 7(e), we
cannot infer that the Congress meant § 7(e) to be merely clarifying language approv-
ing the principle of the Belo case as elaborated and applied in subsequent court
decisions."
19. Brief for Appellant, pp. 11-12, Mitchell v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 228 F.2d
291 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 25 U.S.L. WIMK 3176 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1956) (No. 86).
20. 228 F.2d-291 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 25 U.S.L. WK 3176 (U.S. Dec. 11,
1956) (No. 86).
21. Instant case at 10.
22. 29 C.F.R. § 778.43 (1949) (interpretative bulletin issued by the Wage-Hour
Administrator, Department of Labor).
23. Brief for Appellee, pp. 21-22.
24. 63 STAT. 914 (1949), 29 U.S.C. § 207(e) (1952).
25. 29 C.F.R. § 778.18(b) (1949) (interpretative bulletin issued by the Wage-Hour
Administrator, Department of Labor). (Emphasis added.)
26. "Just cause" is a common provision for the firing of employees. Some contracts
specifically provide "continued absence without good reason." See COmmRCn CLZARlNG
Hous, UNIoN COxTRACr CLAusxs 526-29 (1954).
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pay" to require only that an employee be provided an opportunity to earn
the full weekly guaranty by performing whatever work is needed each
day, and that the guaranty not be reduced for lack of available work.
27
Such a construction of "guaranty" is supported by the use of the term in
the analogous context of guaranteed annual wage contracts where, if work
is available, an employee must perform his duties in order to be paid.
28
If 7(e) allows an employer to pay less than the weekly guaranty
when an empeloyee absents himself from work, there remains the question
of how his compensation may be computed in those weeks. The instant
dissent contended that the wages must then be computed on the basis
of the hourly rate specified in the contract,29 rather than by the propor-
tionate reduction method which has the effect of crediting the employee
with daily overtime.30 This conclusion was apparently founded on the pre-
1949 requirement that unless the specified hourly rate actually received
substantial use in determining employees' compensation it yas not a
"regular rate" within the meaning of 7(a). 31 "Regular rate" was so con-
strued because of the danger that employers would use Belo-type contracts
to circumvent the overtime requirement of 7(a), 2 which was intended to
reward long hours and to spread work by increasing the cost of overtime
to employers.-s The courts were satisfied that the specified rate was rea-
sonably related to the basis of compensation if it was shown that employees
had actually worked sufficient hours in at least some weeks to receive com-
pensation beyond the guaranty and had been paid at the contract overtime
rates.3 4 Under this reasoning, the method of compensation demanded by
27. See Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 331 U.S. 17, 22 (1947).
28. For some typical plans, see Coumncs CL-AmxG Housa, UNION CONTRACT
CLAU ss 369, 375, 380, 385 (1954). See also 5 CCH L A. L. R1np. 50006 (1954)
(proposed guaranteed annual wage plan of UAW, CIO). This is apparently what the
Supreme Court meant, prior to the enactment of 7(e), when it held that a wage
contract did not provide a guaranteed weekly wage. 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v.
Asselta, 331 U.S. 199, 203 (1947).
29. Instant case at 13 (dissenting opinion).
30. See note 35 infra.
31. Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419, 426 (1945);
McComb v. Roig, 181 F.2d 726, 729-30 (1st Cir. 1950) (pre-1949 law applied); Mc-
Comb v. Sterling Ice & Cold Storage Co., 165 F.2d 265,269 (10th Cir. 1947) ; McComb
v. Utica Knitting Co., 164 F.2d 670, 674 (2d Cir. 1947).
32. Since an employee receives no payment beyond the guaranty so long as he works
fewer hours than the assumed number, by setting the assumed number of hours at a
level rarely exceeded an employer could work his employees more hours than the
statutory maximum without paying them the overtime to which -the "regular rate"
method would entitle them. See note 12 supra. Employee consent to such a plan might
not be difficult to obtain, for if the assumed number of hours were sixty and actual
hours fluctuated up to fifty but averaged about forty, employees might well prefer a
guaranteed seventy dollars per week based on an artificial one dollar hourly contract
rate to $1.75 per hour plus overtime without the guaranty. For cases where attempted
circumvention was evident, see 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331 U.S. 199
(1947) ; Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U.S. 427 (1945) ; Walling v. Helmerich
& Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37 (1944). See also Joseph, Construction of Overtime Pro-
visions of Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 LAw. GuILD RaV. 179 (1947).
33. Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 577-78 (1942); H.R.
RPp. No. 267, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1949).
34. Walling v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 331 U.S. 17, 21 (1947);
Walling v. A. H. Belo Corp., 316 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1942); McComb v. Utica Knitting
Co., 164 F.2d 670, 674-77 (2d Cir. 1947). This requirement would frustrate the type of
circumvention described in note 32 supra.
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the instant dissent may have been justified because it would serve as a
valid demonstration that the specified contract rate was "genuine." How-
ever, in most weeks where absences prevent employees from getting the
full guaranty, computing pay by the contract hourly rate would result in less
compensation than by the proportionate reduction method prescribed in
the contract.3 5 Such a result seems contrary to the purposes of an act
designed to benefit employees and may be unnecessary under 7(e). As
the courts have stated, the passage of 7(e) "enabled the courts to make a
fresh start" a6 by providing statutory standards to replace the "confusing
state of the case law" 3 that grew around the Belo doctrine to protect the
overtime requirement. The legislative history of this section indicates
that Congress believed the overtime requirement adequately protected with-
out demanding a "reasonable relationship" between the specified contract
rate and the compensation actually paid. 8 Section 7(e) itself includes
35. In the instant case, the compensation due an employee who was absent one day
and actually worked thirty-four hours in the other four days would be eighteen per
cent lower if computed by the dissen's method than if computed proportionately under
the terms of the contract. The contract's proportionate reduction method would yield
the employee four-fifths of the guaranteed salary, or four-fifths of the pay due for
forty regular and eight overtime hours. This is equivalent to four-fifths of fifty-two
regular hours, or forty-one apd three-fifths hours at the contract hourly rate. How-
ever, the method which the dissent would require would give compensation for only
thirty-four hours at the contract hourly rate.
Only if an employee worked over forty-one and one-fifteenth hours in four days
would he be entitled to less compensation by the contract's proportionate method than
by the dissent's method. (Since the dissent's method would grant the employee the
contra~tual overtime rate as soon as his actual hours exceed forty, the two methods
yield the same compensation in a four-day week at forty-one and one-fifteenth hours,
rather than forty-one and three-fifths hours.)
The dissenting judge was cognizant of this disadvantage to the employees, but felt
constrained to reach this result because of the Supreme Court's decision in 149 Madison
Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331 U.S. 199 (1947). But the issue in that case, which arose
before § 7(e) was enacted, was whether employees who had worked in excess of
forty hours were entitled to overtime compensation, whereas in the instant case there
was no evidence that an employee ever exceeded forty hours without receiving the full
weekly guaranty, regardless of the number of day's worked. Furthermore, in Asselta
the employees were not guaranteed even the opportunity of earning a minimum weekly
sum. If they worked one hour less than that stipulated by the contract their salary was
reduced. Id. at 203. In distinguishing the Belo and Halliburton cases, the Asselta
opinion observed: "[Tihere was here no provision for a guaranteed weekly wage .... "
Ibid.
36. Mitchell v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 228 F.2d 291, 296 (1st Cir. 1956), eert.
denied, 25 U.S.L. WvxK 3176 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1956) (No. 86).
37. Mitchell v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., 235 F.2d 942, 945
(2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 25 U.S.L. W4= 3176 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1956) (No. 513).
38. In adopting the present § 7(e) Congress expressly rejected H.R. 5856,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(c) (1949), which would have permitted Belo-type con-
tracts only if they provided ".... a bona fide hourly rate of pay specified and actually
used as the basis on which all compensation ... is computed .... " 95 CoNG. R.c. 11228
(1949). See also Mitchell v. Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co., supra note
37, at 945. Furthermore, Senator Thomas, chairman of the Senate Labor Committee,
explained in a prepared document that under § 7(e) ".... the specified rate may be as
low as the minimum established by the acf (this would permit use of contracts not
now valid under Belo decision) . . . ." 95 CONG. REc. 12364-65 (1949). This state-
ment suggests that the use in § 7(e) of the adjective "regular" to describe the contract
"rate of pay" may have been intended to denote that the authorized contract rate would
be deemed the "regular rate." But cf. Mitchell v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc., 228 F.2d
291, 296 n.1 (1st Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 25 U.S.L. Wimx 3176 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1956)
(No. 86).
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several safeguardsa 9  Furthermore, since its enactment the courts ap-
parently have found unnecessary a showing that in some workweeks the
employees exceeded the hours represented by the guaranty.4° On this basis
the dissent's requirement is superfluous. Nevertheless, it does not follow
that any method of computing pay in weeks when an employee does not
get his full guaranty should be permitted by the statute. A reasonable
construction of "regular rate" for this purpose would be to allow any
method of computing compensation under which the employee would
receive at least as much as he would if his pay were computed according to
the specified contract rate.
39. Individual contracts must be "bona fide." The guaranty cannot be based on
more than sixty hours work. See note 15 supra. Furthermore, none of the contracts
struck down by the Supreme Court as invalid under the pre-1949 limitations on the
Belo doctrine could meet the express requirements of 7(e). Walling v. Helmerich &
Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37 (1944) .(contract did not provide "... compensation at not less
than one and one-half times [the specified regular] ... rate for all hours worked in
excess of forty.. ."); Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S.
419 (1945) (contract did not provide ". . . a weekly guaranty of pay... based on the
rates. . .specified. . .") (emphasis added) ; Walling v. Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U.S.
427 (1945) (no "weekly guaranty of pay") ; 149 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331
U.S. 199 (1947) (no "weekly guaranty of pay").
40. See cases cited at note 6 supra.
